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Introduction
As the detailed investigations of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working conditions have shown (Sisson and Martin Artiles 2000 , Zagelmeyer 2000 , Freyssinet and Seifert 2001 , in many EU countries an increasing number of collective agreements have been concluded at the inter-professional, sector and company levels explicitly linking employment to competitiveness. So far most of the attention has focused on agreements, commonly referred to as 'social pacts', at the inter-professional level. By comparison, very little is known about the agreements at sector and, more particularly, company level, labelled here as pacts for employment and competitiveness (PECs) to distinguish them from the higher level 'social pacts'. Not only is this very often the first time that employment and competitiveness have been linked in this way, above all at company level, in as much as the detailed implementation of these agreements is usually delegated to individual business units or workplaces, a much wider group of managers and employee representatives is being involved in the negotiating process than ever before.
The negotiation of PECs raises a number of fundamental questions (for further details, see Sisson and Krieger 2001) , including:
• How is the emergence of such pacts at this particular time to be explained and what are the reasons for the different nature and extent of their diffusion? • What assessment is to be made of these agreements? Do PECs improve the long-term competitiveness of European companies or do they simply involve short-term cost cutting in response to a crisis situation? Do they merely benefit 'insiders' at the expense of 'outsiders' • What process is involved? Are PECs to be dismissed as little more than 'concession bargaining'?
Or do they indicate a change in balance between 'distributive bargaining' and 'integrative bargaining? • What are the effects of PECs? Do they worsen or improve pay and conditions? Do they threaten the sector bargaining of national systems or denote the need for new relationships between national, sector and company level agreements?
• What are the implications for employment and labour market policy? Do they support EU employment policy? How are they related to a partnership approach to improve competitiveness and employment?
This article is concerned with the third and fourth of these sets of issues and, in particular, with the implications of PECs for the process and structure of collective bargaining. At the risk of over-simplification, four main concerns may be identified in the comments of some case study and national respondents:
• PECs are encouraging forms of 'micro-corporatism', threatening to raise conflicts between local employee representatives and trade union officials.
• PECs are encouraging a form of 'concession bargaining: instead of being 'genuine', the course of negotiations is dominated by the management position, and employee representatives are confronted with a 'take it or leave it' situation.
• PECs are also encouraging a form of 'regime competition' in which workplace is forced to compete against workplace (Hyman 1994 , Streeck 1992 ).
• The increasing decentralisation of collective bargaining that PECs encourage will bring about greater fragmentation and may eventually lead to the so-called ' Americanisation' of industrial relations, in which sector agreements are replaced by company bargaining or the unilateral determination of wages and conditions by management (Martin 1999) .
The argument developed here is that, although these concerns are justified, PECs are not themselves the source of the problem. Rather, PECs are a manifestation of wider changes taking place in the process and structure of collective bargaining in EU member states, reflecting the more complex role collective bargaining is playing. These changes, which are bringing about a measure of convergence across EU countries, notably in sectors such as metalworking and financial services, involve the levels, scope, form and output of collective bargaining. Moreover, the multi-level system of industrial relations emerging in Europe is itself beginning to have an impact here. In formal terms, this multi-level system is not only a dependent variable to be explained in terms of 'globalisation' or 'regionalisation' (i.e. 'Europeanisation'); it is also an intervening variable, in as much as the evolving patterns of regulation, 'policy networks' and policy discourses are influencing existing processes and structures.
Changing roles for collective bargaining
To paraphrase the Supiot report (1999: 140-7), in many EU countries, notably those approximating to the so-called 'Continental' or 'Franco-German' model, collective bargaining has traditionally been seen primarily as a means of improving on the legal status of employees. Increasingly, however, it is assuming a wider range of functions 1 . It is not just that the content of 1 It has long been accepted, especially in the Anglo-American literature, that collective bargaining fulfils a wider range of functions. From Dunlop (1958) and Flanders (1970) comes the emphasis on collective bargaining as a rule-making process (see also Slichter, Healy and Livernash 1960) . Collective bargaining, for which Flanders suggested a better description would be joint regulation, makes it possible to agree the key procedural as well as substantive rules governing the employment relationship, be they informal
Pacts for employment and competitiveness − an opportunity to reflect on the role and practice of collective bargaining legislation is very often determined by collective bargaining (loi négociée). As well as taking over some of the legislative functions of the state, collective bargaining has been given greater responsibility for implementing legal provisions (i.e. a regulatory function) and has also become an instrument of adaptability (i.e. a flexibility function). In some cases, it has even involved employees in economic decision-making within the company (i.e. a management function).
A major consideration in the changing roles of collective bargaining is the growing social and economic complexity stemming from the twin processes of differentiation and interdependency.
As Chouraqui (1998) reminds us, it is not just a question of a secular increase in complexity or the continuous acceleration in the rate of change. The signs are that the rapid development of what he refers to as 'dynamic complexity' is not a temporary phenomenon involving a transition from one fixed state to another, but a permanent one, with significant destabilising effects for traditional patterns of regulation. Put simply, collective bargaining is having to grapple with a raft of 'new' issues, reflecting the pressures of 'globalisation' and 'Europeanisation'. The issues covered by PECs, involving the use of collective bargaining to link employment and competitiveness are an excellent example − EMU is intensifying the pressures for restructuring that 'globalisation' is promoting. Figure 1 , which draws on the detailed case studies of the European Foundation's investigation (Sisson and Martin Artiles 2000) , gives some idea of the range of subjects that can be included at the company level.
The second consideration is the spread of what has been termed 'contract culture' (Supiot 2000: 321) , reflecting the growing importance of market principles and business models in policy making. In Supiot's (2000: 341) own words,
In face of the commercial contract, which is becoming internationalised, we then have to accommodate the entire contractual panoply which has accompanied decentralisation, regional development policy, agricultural policy and employment policy. In labour law this evolution has meant a decentralisation of the sources of law: from statute law to collective agreement, from industry-level agreement to company-level agreement to individual contract of employment.
As Ferner and Hyman (1998: xvi) very perceptively recognise, the decentralisation of collective bargaining has 'strong parallels − possibly not altogether accidental − with the widespread pattern of co-ordinated devolution of managerial responsibilities that has taken place within large corporations in recent years'. Significantly, too, the 'managed autonomy' (Marginson and Sisson 1996: 177) that sums up the way the modern corporation is run has strong parallels with the 'regulated autonomy' to be found in theories of so-called 'reflexive law'. Essentially, 'reflexive law' represents an attempt to find a balance between heteronomy and autonomy, i.e. central regulation, on the one hand, and deregulation, on the other. In the words of Barnard and Deakin (2000: 341) ,
The essence of reflexive law is the acknowledgement that regulatory interventions are most likely to be successful when they seek to achieve their ends not by direct prescription, but by inducing 'second-order effects' on the part of social actors. In other words, this approach aims to 'couple' external regulation with self-regulatory processes. Reflexive law therefore has a procedural orientation. What this means, in the context of economic regulation, is that the preferred mode of intervention is for the law to underpin and encourage autonomous processes of adjustment, in particular by supporting mechanisms of group representation and participation, rather than to intervene by imposing particular distributive outcomes.
Examples cited include the Working Time Directive and the European Works Councils Directive. The first empowers trade unions and employers to make qualified exceptions to limits on working time. The second gives management and employee representatives considerable latitude to negotiate appropriate mechanisms for transnational information and consultation.
The authors go on to remind us that: The whole social dialogue process which was initiated by the Maastricht Treaty is, of course, reflexive harmonisation writ large. Perhaps its most distinctive aspect is the creation of an institutional procedure which operates through self-regulation by the two sides of industry, but is also transnational in character. It operates beyond the level of individual member states, rather than either above or below them. The framework directives that have emerged so far from the social dialogue process are good examples of 'negotiated law'. Not only do
Figure 1 Possible contents of PECs
• guarantees of employment and/or no compulsory redundancy (open-ended or specific period) • investment for particular establishments • transformation of precarious into more stable jobs.
• additional employment for specific groups (e.g. young people, long-term unemployed)
• the relocation of the workforce within the company • the introduction of 'work foundations' to improve the employment prospects of redundant workers • reduction in pay levels and associated benefits, lower starter rates for new employees • commitments to moderate pay demands • increases linked to key indicators such as prices, productivity, exchange rates.
• share ownership • temporary or long-term reduction in the working week • greater variability in and extension of working hours without overtime premium • the increased use of part-time work • extension of operating hours (e.g. weekend work)
• conditions for use of fixed-term contracts, temporary work and contracting out • new forms of work organisation (e.g. team work)
• training and development Source: Sisson and Krieger (2001) .
Pacts for employment and competitiveness − an opportunity to reflect on the role and practice of collective bargaining TRANSFER 4/01they result from a process of transnational negotiation, but they also envisage local-level implementation through collective bargaining or similar methods of joint regulation at industry or plant level.
Also important to remember in discussing the influence of business models is that benchmarking, which started life as a management tool to increase competitive performance, has become integral to the working of the EU. Not only did the extraordinary summit in Lisbon in 2000 set the strategic goal, over the next ten years of becoming 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge economy in the world, capable of durable economic growth, of higher employment levels and jobs of a better quality and of improved social cohesion'. Procedurally, Lisbon saw the confirmation of the so-called 'open co-ordination method' developed since the Luxembourg summit. National employment policies are to be put to the test of national comparison, involve targets to be reached within a specified timetable and be subject to scrutiny (peer group review) by a wide range of EU institutions and subject to their recommendations (see Goetschy 2001 , Keller 2001 ).
Trade unions have not been slow to learn the lessons. Bench marking and target setting have become integral to the co-ordinated bargaining being mounted by several of the ETUC's industry federations, such as the European Metalworkers' Federation and UNI-Europa (finance).
The overall effect of the wider roles being assumed by collective bargaining is to bring about a considerable shift of emphasis in the key assumptions, subjects and processes of industrial relations, which are increasingly influential at national as well as EU levels. Figure 2 tries to capture the emphasis of this shift in contrasting caricatures of the 'old' and the 'new' industrial relations paradigms. It is with the implications in terms of the levels, scope, form and output of collective bargaining that the rest of the article is concerned.
Implications for the practice of collective bargaining
Changing levels − the rise of company bargaining Clearly, PECs are adding to the pressure for the decentralisation of collective bargaining observed in western Europe since 1980. Sometimes they have benefited from the decline of sector-level negotiation (as in the UK), and sometimes they have been made possible by the widening of the field of responsibility bestowed upon company negotiation (as in France, Italy and the Netherlands). In other countries, they reflect the introduction of 'opening clauses' or 'hardship clauses' into sector agreements (as in Austria and Germany).
The trend towards greater decentralisation of bargaining structures, from the multi-sector to the sector level and from sector to company level, is of course nothing new, and reflects long-running pressure from employers for greater scope to negotiate arrangements suited to the particular requirements of companies. Thus, there is a widespread consensus that most EU countries have experienced within their national systems what has been described as 'centrally co-ordinated decentralisation ' (Ferner and Hyman 1992: xxxvi) or 'organised decentralisation' (Traxler 1995) . An important recent feature of collective bargaining, variously described as 'opening clauses' Keith Sisson TRANSFER 4/01(Germany) or 'discount clauses' (Italy), are the provisions giving the individual employer a degree of flexibility, through negotiation with their own employees, in applying the collectively agreed standards at sector level. In the case of metalworking in Germany, for example, 'opening clauses' have created the option to deviate from the uniform and binding standards of the sector agreements in areas such as working time and pay. Bispinck (1998: 119) distinguishes two parallel overlapping variants of 'adaptations':
• differentiation: implementation of differing collectively agreed standards for certain groups of employees, enterprises or parts of branches, and • lowering of collectively agreed standards: uniform reduction of collectively agreed provisions and payments for all employees of one enterprise.
Fundamentally important is that it is very difficult to deal with the kind of detail involved in the negotiation of PECs at higher levels. Indeed, it is very difficult to deal with it at the company level in many cases. Significant here is that most of the PECs that are multi-establishment also make provision for further decentralisation within the company to individual workplaces and/or business units. Major examples include Zanussi and Air France, where 18 and 27 separate bargaining units were involved respectively.
The point is that decentralisation has great advantages in helping to deal with both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of the collective action problem (see also Traxler 1997: 33-4) . It makes it
Figure 2 Changing emphases in industrial relations
The 'old' industrial relations The 'new' industrial relations Key assumptions
Source: Sisson and Marginson (2001) .
Pacts for employment and competitiveness − an opportunity to reflect on the role and practice of collective bargaining TRANSFER 4/01possible for the principals to set a sense of direction and yet to avoid failures to agree over the details that can so easily bedevil negotiations on the horizontal dimension. At the same time, by delegating responsibilities to representatives at lower levels to tailor solutions to their immediate situation, it helps to relieve the collective action problem on the vertical dimension.
Changing scope − handling restructuring?
If there is one thing that PECs confirm, it is that collective bargaining can encompass a very wide scope of issues − collective bargaining certainly does not just involve improvements to the legal status of employees. Some idea of the substantive contents have appeared in Figure 1 , confirming that collective bargaining has acquired both a flexibility and a management function. Yet even Figure 1 does not capture the wide-range of issues typically covered. Agreements or sections of agreements covering matters such as new shift patterns or training and development can involve several pages. The contingencies that have to be covered can be extremely complex and there can be considerable spill-over effects. For example, the 1994 Volkswagen agreement dealing with a reduction in the working week led to agreements covering clocking, time credits, the integration of apprentices into employment and the phased retirement of older workers.
A number of PECs make explicit provision for strengthening the role of employee representatives in company decision. In the case of Alitalia, for example, the agreement provided for the setting up of an industrial relations system based on the involvement of all categories of personnel; such a model should institutionalise processes of information and control regarding the measures included in the plan and provide for the creation of bilateral bodies which have to elaborate projects finalised to making decisions relating to specific matters of strategic value.
To that end, the agreement established so-called 'bilateral bodies' to deal with a range of issues such as the verification of the implementation of the industrial restructuring plan 1996-2000; the evolution and development of routes and fleet; customer services; organisational structures and processes; and staff training.
Another example is the so-called 'Company-wide action team' (CWAT), involving shop stewards and managers, which oversees the partnership arrangements at Blue Circle Cement in the UK. As one shop steward has reported (Warren 1999: 14-5) , under the 'old way' of handling redundancies, 90 days' notice would have been given in line with statutory requirements, followed by formal consultation carried out with recognised unions, but there would have been no offers of redeployment and all employees would have been made redundant. As a result of the partnership agreement, however, detailed discussions at all levels within the company have taken place about the way in which the closures would be handled and the consequences for the employees concerned. In particular, he cites the initiatives taken by the CWAT, following the announcement of the closure of two workplaces in 1999 involving the loss of 250 employees. Meetings were held to allow employees to raise their concerns; a training and development programme was developed for those who wished to remain with Blue Circle; and what he describes as a 'generous' redundancy package worked out for those unable to relocate, embracing financial advice, help with CVs and interviewing
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TRANSFER 4/01skills, and the organisation of job fairs so that local companies could see for themselves the skills and experience that Blue Circle employees had to offer.
Collective bargaining, it seems, is proving itself to be very capable of coping with the increasing complexities of managing the employment relationship. Indeed, given the sensitivity as well as the complexities of the issues involved, it is difficult to imagine that the alternative processes (namely legislation and management decision) could adequately deal with them.
Changing form − from 'distributive' to integrative' bargaining
In as much as PECs involve concessions, they can be categorised as a form of 'concession bargaining'. Yet PECs would appear to be different from the 'concession bargaining' that has come to be associated with the USA 2 . Virtually all of the PECs reviewed in the European Foundation study involved some form of 'concession' on the part of the employer as well as employees, even if it is impossible to balance one against the other. Critically important, too, unlike the USA, in the great majority of cases, there were no obvious signs that management has been trying to undermine the position of employee representatives. On the contrary, one of the more remarkable features of PECs is the extent to which management goes out of its way to ensure that it has the agreement of employee representatives in order to maximise the legitimacy of what it feels has to be done.
Especially relevant to understanding the process that is typically involved in the negotiation of PECs is the distinction Walton and McKersie (1965) draw between distributive bargaining and 2 As the project's concept paper points out (Sisson et al. 1999: 14-5) , a major problem is that there is no accepted definition of concession bargaining. Interestingly, the only one of the European Foundation's glossaries to include the term is the French. Here concession bargaining is described as 'give-and-take' and 'win-win' agreements in which 'reciprocal exchange is strongly emphasised; in return for an undertaking to limit the number of redundancies or reduce general working hours, for example, the employees' side accepts the reopening of discussions on pay structure or the pace of work' (European Foundation 1997: 154) . The term is used in a similar way in recent German literature (see, for example, Kotthoff 1998 and Mueller-Jentsch 1998) . Indeed, our German correspondents make a point of emphasising that that the term is explicitly used in this way in the case of one of the Lufthansa agreements. Evidently, under this first definition virtually all PECs would be categorised as concession bargaining. In fact, the only type of collective bargaining that would not be so defined would be the simplest form of distributive bargaining, where the concessions were one way from employer to employees. Arguably, it is the second definition, associated with the US, which offers the more appropriate benchmark for present purposes. In this case, 'concession bargaining' not only involves a range of specific features such as a 'nominal wage cut or wage freeze during the first year of an agreement' (Mitchell 1994: 438) or attempts to 're-open contracts or to seek rollbacks in the terms of contracts' (Kochan et al. 1986: 115) . It is also very much one sided, there being few if any quid pro quos on the part of employers. Another distinguishing feature is that this form of concession bargaining has often been very confrontational and linked to a strategy of 'union avoidance' or 'union busting'. One of the more remarkable features of PECs is the extent to which managers have gone out of their way to ensure the agreement of employee representatives in order to maximise the legitimacy of the outcome.
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integrative bargaining. In the first, there tend to 'winners and losers' in a 'fixed-sum' or 'zero-sum' game. In the second there can be mutual gains in what is a 'positive-sum' game.
There is certainly a strong element of quid pro quo and problem solving about the process of negotiating PECs, which is characteristic of integrative bargaining. Significantly, too, many of the mechanisms of integrative bargaining are to be found. These include joint working parties and facilitators as well as legitimating devices such as benchmarking, drawing attention to self-evident truths (which nonetheless have to be seen to be appropriate in the situation) and continuous review of progress. In as much as many of the measures are medium-term in both their implementation and their effects, employee representatives are also involved in on-going joint monitoring and assessment.
Especially noticeable, however, is the key role played by management. Traditionally, in forms of distributive bargaining, it is the trade union that takes and is expected to take the initiative in formulating claims and demands, while the management is largely reactive. This reflects the mutual recognition implicit in the process of collective bargaining and which is often enshrined in the earliest agreements, such the national compromises in Denmark and Sweden in 1896 and 1906 respectively, or the provisions for avoiding disputes in engineering in the UK in 1898. In principle, management grants recognition to trade unions for the purposes of negotiating over particular terms and conditions of employment. In return, the trade union accepts the right of management to make other decisions, including the size of the workforce, more or less unilaterally.
In the case of PECs, it is management which very often played the key role, initiating the negotiations and coming to the bargaining table with their own bargaining agenda. Sometimes this was direct. Sometimes it was indirect: managers wished to make fundamental changes which in turn led to the acceptance of the need to reach an agreement. Important too is that, as well as seeking to negotiate changes in the terms and conditions of employment covered by traditional collective bargaining, management was also often willing to go further and include items that previously were regarded as falling within its prerogative, such as future investment or the implementation of changes in work organisation.
The cynic might say that, in many cases, management did not have a great deal of choice in the matter. The practical reality is that many of the changes that management were seeking to introduce involved the terms and conditions of existing collective agreements and/or works agreements. In most countries the terms and conditions of existing collective agreements cannot be changed unilaterally without the agreement of the signatory trade unions. While the legal status of works agreements means that, in theory, there are fewer restrictions on management's unilateral action, tearing them up would nonetheless be a big step to take.
Arguably even important, however, is that intensifying competition requires management both to minimise costs and promote the co-operation and commitment of the workforce necessary for continuous improvement (for Europe, see Herriot et al. 1998 ; for the USA, see Cappelli et al. 1997) . In these circumstances, the legitimacy of management decision-making can be profoundly important, helping to explain why managers seek the agreement of employee representatives. In
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The jury is out on whether this shift is leading to a fundamental change in relationships between the parties. What is clear, though, is such integrative bargaining does not necessarily replace the more traditional forms of distributive or adversarial bargaining. Rather they sit side-by-side.
Changing outputs -from 'hard' to 'soft regulation?
As the Supiot (1999: 145-6 ) report reminds us, a further consequence of the developments taking place has been a shift in emphasis from 'hard' to 'soft' regulation (see Figure 3 for number of inter-related contrasts between 'soft' and 'hard' forms of regulation). It is not just that more issues are being decided by collective bargaining, leading to the tendency to divest laws of substantive rules, which tend to be 'hard' in form', in favour of rules on negotiation, which tend to be 'soft'. In recent years, so-called 'proceduralisation' has been affecting collective bargaining as well; there has also been a considerable growth in the number of 'framework agreements', joint opinions, declarations, resolutions, recommendations, proposals, guide-lines, codes of conduct and agreement protocols (European Commission 2000: 17) .
The trend is especially evident at international level, where the collective action problem is particularly acute. Examples at global level include the recent revision of the OECD guidelines for • 'soft' regulation tends to deal with general principles, whereas 'hard' regulation is concerned with specific rights and obligations • 'soft' regulation, where it does deal with rights and obligations, tends to be concerned with minimum provisions, whereas the equivalent 'hard' regulation involves standard ones • 'soft' regulation often provides for further negotiation at lower levels, whereas 'hard' regulation tends to assume the process is finished -following French usage, 'hard' regulation might be described as parfait or complete and 'soft' regulation as imparfait or incomplete (for further details, see UIMM 1968: 94) • 'soft' regulation relies on open-ended processes such as bench marking and peer group audit, with monitoring and 'moral-suasion' for enforcement, whereas 'hard' regulation tends to rely on sanctions • 'soft' regulation, in as much as it takes the form of 'recommendations' or 'opinions' or 'declarations', might be described as permissive, whereas 'hard' regulation is almost invariably compulsory • 'soft' regulation tends to be concerned with soft issues such as equal opportunities or training and development, whereas 'hard' regulation deals with hard ones such as pay and working time (for further details, see Sisson and Marginson 2001) .
Pacts for employment and competitiveness − an opportunity to reflect on the role and practice of collective bargaining multinational companies (MNCs), the proliferation of individual MNC corporate codes of conduct (see European Works Council Bulletin, 2000, Nos. 27 and 28) and the attempts to promote employment standards in NAFTA (see Teague 2000) . Examples at EU level include the agreements reached under the Maastricht social chapter, the burgeoning volume of joint opinions, recommendations and framework agreements emerging from the EU sectoral social dialogue (European Commission 2000, Keller and Sörries 1999a and b, Keller and Bansbach 2000) and the joint texts concluded by some European Works Councils (Carley 2000 ).
Yet the same trend is also prominent within national systems, what the European Commission (1997: 14) describes as 'flexible frameworks', rather than 'compulsory and rigid systems', being a widespread trend. Typically, the higher the level at which a collective agreement is reached, the more likely it is to take the form of a framework agreement or accord cadre, wherein much of the regulation is of the 'soft' or incomplete variety. Indeed, a key rationale of much of the higher-level activity − indeed, it is the very essence of 'organised decentralisation' -is to lay the way for more detailed negotiations at lower levels that can embrace 'hard' regulation tailor-made to the specific circumstances of individual units. Most social pacts between national social partners take the form of 'framework agreements (Pochet and Fajertag 2000) , as do many company-level PECs. An excellent example is Air France's Accord pour un Développement Partagé. This has been publicised as an agreement trading off a reduction in working time against the creation of 4 000 new jobs in line with the loi Aubry. Essentially, however, it is a framework agreement (accord cadre). Critically, as Mériaux (1999) reminds us, the achievement of this objective depends on local agreements in 26 establishments dealing with the flexibility of working time and work organisation.
Just as the kind of detail involved in the negotiation of PECs cannot be dealt with at higher levels, so too it is much more difficult to pin down in the form of 'hard' regulation. This would be true, for example, of commitments to flexibility and continuous improvement or the involvement of employee representatives in the organisation's planning for the future. In these and other cases, delegation of the responsibility for implementation to lower levels, to go back to an earlier point, can also mean that the company-level provisions are general in definition.
Discussion and implications
PECs raise understandable concerns − in particular, about the potential for 'concession bargaining', 'regime competition' and the fragmentation of the multi-employer bargaining structures characteristic of most European national systems. PECs are not themselves the source of the problem, however, nor should they be seen as a temporary phenomenon. Rather they are symptomatic of wider developments in the role of collective bargaining, reflecting 'globalisation' in general and 'Europeanisation' in particular. These developments are also bringing about a measure of convergence across EU countries in the form of substantial changes in the levels, scope, form and output of collective bargaining, all of which are being encouraged by the emerging multi-level system of industrial relations in Europe.
These developments have a powerful dynamic with significant advantages. Not only have they made it possible to begin to resolve the seemingly intractable problems of the boundary between Keith Sisson national and transnational jurisdictions through a regulatory method which provides for both 'community and autonomy' (Falkner 1998: 152) . They have also enabled the social partners to embrace a wider range of issues reflecting the rapidly changing environment. Perhaps most importantly, many more of the people (managers and employees) who are directly involved in implementing the results of collective agreements are involved. In that sense, they might be said to be encouraging more democratic decision making.
Even so, there is a need to minimise the potential disadvantages. Here the argument has a number of implications. Contrary to much conventional industrial relations analysis, developments at EU levels, while important, are not the priority. It is developments at the national level that deserve attention − inclusive structures of multi-employer bargaining at national level are the foundation stones of the multi-level European system that is emerging. Critically important is that the growing tendency within national systems to transfer issues for implementation to the company and the workplace does not mean the demise of sector agreements. Such agreements have a critical role to play in setting directions as well as establishing minimum standards. In practice, as Traxler (1998) has also argued, this means emphasising their substantive as well as procedural content.
Otherwise there is a danger that the 'proceduralisation' or 'hollowing out' of multi-employer agreements will indeed lead to fragmentation and disintegration, as the experience of the UK exemplifies 3 . Critically, too, as UK experience also confirms, once such agreements have gone, governments no longer have the option of looking to the social partners to assume a significant measure of responsibility for employment regulation of either the 'soft' or 'hard' variety. If they need to regulate, either to fulfil their domestic agenda or to implement EU directives, they have little alternative but to follow the legislative route, thereby undermining commitment to the outcomes.
Much also remains to be played for in terms of the form that future 'soft' regulation might take.
Returning to an earlier point, the degree of 'softness' of different forms of 'soft' regulation varies, with some forms combining both 'soft' and 'hard' dimensions. There is considerable difference, for instance, between joint texts elaborating a set of principles without further consequences for constituent organisations at local levels, and those whose express intention is to 'incite' negotiations on the matter in questions at these levels with mechanisms to monitor implementation. The contrast is even greater with a framework agreement that establishes a set of principles or minimum standards binding on the signatory parties − the 'hard' dimension − but within which local representatives have scope to fashion their own solutions − the 'soft' dimension.
At EU level, rather than the vain pursuit of a European system of legal regulation and collective bargaining similar to a national system, much greater emphasis needs to be placed on co-ordination to achieve 'best practice'. Ideally, this should be joint. If not, the prime responsibility rests 3 Of course, both the form and status of multi-employer agreements in the UK have always been very different. Whereas in other EU countries, such agreements were built on substantive rules, which were intended to exhaust negotiations for a specified period, in the UK, they developed on the basis of procedural rules, reflecting the confrontation between employers and craft unions. Also in the UK, priority was given to voluntary rather than compulsory rules, because of the opposition of both employers and trade unions to legal involvement. Collective agreements remain 'gentlemen's agreements', 'binding in honour', rather than legally enforceable contracts.
Pacts for employment and competitiveness − an opportunity to reflect on the role and practice of collective bargaining with trade unions and those national governments sympathetic to developing the 'European social model'. Moreover, there is a need to extend the focus beyond wages − in an era of relatively low inflation, the margin for other than symbolic action will be relatively small. It is the issues covered in PECs that deserve urgent attention. Especially desirable would be codes of 'best practice' covering the handling of restructuring − both the procedural aspects, such as information and consultation, and the substantive, including work organisation, training and development, and redeployment. Such codes might be the basis for encouraging large private and public sector organisations to help diffuse better standards to SMEs through their supply chains, as well as the 'naming and shaming' associated with ethical retailing campaigns involving companies such as Nike or Addidas (Donaldson 2000) .
